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Introduction
How does male military service affect longer term civilian labour market prospects? This question has been investigated along three distinct lines of enquiry in relatively recent times. These encompass research into the economic effects of (a) the Vietnam draft (Angrist, 1990; Angrist and Krueger, 1994) , (b) voluntary military service in the U.S. (Angrist, 1998) , and (c) peacetime compulsory military service in Europe (Imbens and van der Klaauw, 1995; Buonanno, 2007; Bauer, Bender, Paloyo and Schmid, 2009) . A major theme that runs through all of this work concerns the effect of military service on future real earnings. Most of these studies find varying degrees of deleterious effects of service on later earnings outcomes. Bauer et al. (2009) , however, find that there are no negative earnings effects linked to the German military draft in the 1950s. Moreover, several earlier U.S. studies show that military service and training can lead to positive earnings outcomes among those who served in the military compared to those who never served (see Mangum and Ball, 1989 , for a review). This paper belongs to the third area of research. Based on a regression discontinuity design (RDD), it compares the long-term real earnings outcomes of men who were conscripted into the British armed services from 1949 to the end of 1960 with later male cohorts who were not eligible for compulsory service. This episode of conscription was universally referred to as National Service and involved men aged 18 to 26. We find no evidence of differences in earnings outcomes between eligible and not eligible groups. In general, we argue that we should not necessarily expect major longterm real earnings disadvantages for those experiencing a period of conscription 3 compared to subsequent birth cohorts who were exempt. Essentially, we say more on the central hypothesis of Angrist (1990) which holds that those who served in the military "earn less because their military experience is only a partial substitute for the civilian labor market experience lost while in the armed forces". We outline the main socio-economic costs and benefits of conscription and conclude that it is difficult to make a priori judgements concerning longer term net labour market outcomes.
We offer three major areas of added value compared to earlier related work.
First, our data on postings into the armed services are necessarily obtained from a different source from our pay data. Accordingly, we employ Two Sample Two Stage Least Squares (TS2SLS) to obtain instrumental variable estimates of the effects of conscription on wage earnings. We estimate the local average treatment effect, that is the effect of military service on the earnings of those forced to serve through conscription. Second, our RDD incorporates a comprehensive allocation of military postings by birth cohorts. Of particular interest, we find that significant proportions of eligible conscripts were not called-up at the earliest possible date but, rather, had their postings deferred to later years. We show that accounting for deferments within the conscription data has radical implications for estimated outcomes compared to earlier related work in which deferments were not properly accommodated (Buonnano, 2007; Hart, 2009 ). Third, we assess implications for estimated earnings effects when taking into consideration the fact that many males towards the end of the period of National Service avoided call-up by either taking up or prolonging existing industrial or academic training.
2 Post-war British Conscription, 1949 -1960
Under the National Service Act 1948, 'peacetime' conscription to the armed services was introduced in Great Britain in January 1949. Up to October 1950, conscription lasted for a period of 18 months and then, in response to the Korean War, it was extended to 2 years. All males aged between 18 and 26 were liable to register for this so-called National Service.
1 Conscription was ended in December, 1960 . Table 1 shows the proportions of men born in the years 1930 to 1939 -i.e. the cohorts eligible for conscription -who were subsequently posted into the armed services during the period of National Service. 2 The postings data are taken from Wallis (1977) who has meticulously assembled the full information using 40 official government reports, In the early years of conscription, the overwhelming majority of age groups posted to the services were in their teens. Thus, for the initial two intake years, 1949 and 1950, 51% of those posted were aged 18 and 36% aged 19. Only 6% were aged 20, 6% aged 21, 1% aged 22 and none were posted aged 23 or over. Effectively, therefore, 1930 marked the first birth year from which significant numbers were called up. Full details are provided by Wallis (1977, pp. 97-99 and Table 11 ). In the last years of conscription, the position is even more clear cut. New postings applied to those born before 1 st October 1939. This premature end of call-up occurred because the government concentrated on clearing a large accumulated backlog of men whose call-up had been earlier deferred. This policy decision forms an important aspect of the current paper.
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was an almost unbroken decline. By the 1938 birth cohort, which was the last full birth year of conscription eligibility, 40% of males were posted.
What accounts for the differences in the proportion conscripted within each birth cohort as we move down column (1) Wallis (1977, pp. 85-87) offers some explanations for these trends, mainly linked to changes in the composition, expertise and autonomy of the Medical Boards that undertook the medical examinations.
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policy of prioritizing postings to the accumulations of earlier deferments thereby significantly reducing call-up based on new registrations. Since voluntary armed service had started to decline among the 1937-1939 birth cohorts, the 'available but not posted' category provided an increasingly large share of the proportions within the last cohorts in column (3). By the 1939 cohort, they accounted for roughly 75% of those not posted.
The 'deferred and never posted' proportions by birth cohort are shown in column (3). They accounted for 13% of males over all cohorts. Up to 1936, this category comprised about 10% of each birth cohort. Thereafter, the percentage grew steeply in successive years -14% in 1937, 22% in 1938 and 27% in 1939. In columns (4) -(6), we break down the proportions in column (3) into three sub-groups -viz. training/ education, essential occupations 5 , and hardship 6 . Deferment linked to training or education, shown in column (4), was dominated by (a) apprentices and so-called learners who were undertaking practical training leading to professional qualifications, and (b) students who were studying for university and other higher educational qualifications.
7 These two types of deferment accounted for a large part of the 7 substantial end-period growth of the 'deferred and never posted' category in column (4). Deferment for occupation-related reasons, shown in column (5), was also an important constituent part of the 'deferred and never posted' category of individuals.
However, unlike their training/education equivalents, this group exhibited relatively small variations in their shares over the birth cohorts. Column (6) (Wallis, 1977 ; see also Royle, 1986 and 19. A steep decline in the third year within a given cohort was followed by a slight 9 increase among 21 year olds and then by a gradual decline for those aged 22 and above.
The rise at age 21 was due, primarily, to postings following the completion of education or company training. From the 1937 cohort onwards, there were significant growth rates in postings by age cohort among the post-20 year olds. In fact, the majority of postings from the latter cohorts occurred at age twenty and above.
The costs and benefits of military conscription
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Did National Service involve net long-term costs in respect of the civilian jobs market? The present study falls into the class of papers that compares post-service earnings of those who served in the military to the earnings of those who never served. Mangum and Ball (1989) 
Costs (i) Losses of work experience and human capital
One of the obvious potential costs faced by many conscripts was that, due to an 18 month or two-year service posting, they had to forego returns to civilian work experience at a critically early stage of career development. 11 For some, conscription would also have resulted additionally in losses associated with the acquisition of firmspecific human capital and/or the depreciation of acquired capital.
Such human capital losses are maximised when there is no offsetting training or experience provided by the armed services of value to civilian life. Wallis (1977, pp. 130/1) reports that, from 1949 to 1960, 38% of army conscripts joined the 'teeth' Arm (Infantry, Artillery and Armoured Corp) where firing rifles and guns were the most essential of their acquired skills. 12 In fact, the most desirable skills of an infantryman may have involved the acquisition of especially high human capital specificity. Field Marshall Lord Wavell itemised such skills as those of "a successful poacher, a cat-burglar and a gunman".
(ii) Adjustment costs
There is some evidence that the return to civilian life after conscription involved adjustment costs as young men attempted to make the transition between two very different working environments. Hickman (2004, p.218 ) reports on a 1957 survey of 70 companies' experience of returning conscripts. Problems were reported of work motivation following spells in the services during which there was less demand on individuals' working time. Ferguson and Cunnison (1959) report on a study of 771 men who left school in Glasgow at the minimum age of 14 in 1947. Of these, 498 were called up for National Service (346 at age 18 and 152 at age 21 in order for them to complete their apprenticeship training) with the remaining 273 rejected as unfit on medical grounds. The interesting finding between the Service and non-Service groups is that men of 'good' or 'average' scholastic ability exhibited post-conscription reductions in undertaking skilled work from 64% to 50% while their equivalents who were rejected for conscription showed no change over the same period, at a constant 41%.
Benefits
(i) Marketable skills and general experience provided by the armed services
For many conscripts, service in the armed forces involved training and experience of direct value in civilian work applications. Even in the infantry, the section of the army most removed from civilian working life, general training and work experience opportunities of use in post-army life were quite abundant (Forty, 1998, p. 12 165). In each infantry battalion only about half of the 800 men were earmarked for direct combat. By the end of WWII, a battalion included about 90 motor vehicles, ranging from motor cycles to 3 ton trucks, and needed drivers who were trained in basic maintenance. It included a pioneer platoon of about 30 men who were carpenters, plumbers, bricklayers. It also contained a signals' platoon who were trained to operate quite complex radio and telephone equipment. Beyond the infantry, in the remaining two-thirds of the army, the largest combat arms after the infantry were the Royal Wallis, 1977, pp. 139-42) . As for leadership opportunities and responsibilities, Wallis calculates that, in the decade preceding the end of conscription, 16% of army conscripts gained promotion.
In the cases of conscripts with higher levels of training and education, the armed services could also add long-term value. From 1942 all recruits were given intelligence and aptitude tests. Job descriptions were drawn up so that men with given aptitudes could be posted to the appropriate jobs. The transition from test score to job placement involved a period of job training (as much as 30 weeks, for example, for posting to the Royal Corps of Signals). Men with university degrees were directed along one of several routes. From the outset, they were earmarked as potential officers and tested to determine their potential leadership qualities. If they passed the test then, after 6 months training, they would spend 12-15 months as an officer, responsible for perhaps 30 men. Many who failed the test were posted to the Royal Army Education Corps where they had the opportunity to make use of university-acquired transferable skills in teaching numeracy and literacy. Men with science and engineering degrees were commissioned into one of the scientific corps where they could make direct use of their degrees. As for men with apprenticeships, the army and other services went to considerable lengths to make direct use of their acquired trade skills.
Wage Data and Coverage
The sources of our wage data are outlined briefly below. There are three common denominators. First, all wage measures embrace both full-time and part-time workers. Second, all wages are deflated by the Retail Price Index. Third, to avoid outliers, we exclude the top and bottom percentiles from each of the three wage distributions.
(a) New Earnings Survey Panel Data (NESPD)
The NESPD is a panel covering a random sample of 1% of the British workforce. It is an employer survey of individual-level data obtained from company payrolls.
Estimation is based on the data from 1975 to 2001. Data are obtained from company payrolls with employers legally obliged to provide the information which refers to a given week in April of each year. Accordingly, there is a high response rate. Statistics refer, principally, to earnings and hours of work and given they are taken directly from payroll records they are considered to be very accurate. This paper makes use of the basic or standard weekly wage, defined in the NESPD as "gross weekly earnings excluding overtime divided by normal basic hours for employees whose pay for the survey period was not affected by absence". Estimation was also undertaken using hourly wage earnings (including overtime) to replace standard hourly wages but this produced no substantive changes.
(b) General Household Survey (GHS)
The GHS is a continuous national survey of people living in private households, conducted on an annual basis by the Office for National Statistics (ONS). It started in 1971 and has been carried out since then, except for breaks in 1997-1998 when the survey was reviewed and in 1999-2000 when the survey was redeveloped. Unlike NESPD, the GHS is not a panel but rather a set of repeated cross-sections. Being a household survey, it is subject to non-response and reporting error. The average response rate for the GHS during the periods incorporated here is 82% and it exhibits very little year-to-year variation. The weekly earnings data in the GHS are probably inferior to NESPD due to mis-reporting, non-response, and changes over time in the exact definition of earnings. We make use of the 1979 -1993 surveys.
(c) UK Family Expenditure Survey (FES)
The FES is a voluntary survey of a random sample of private households in the 
Estimation and Results
We adopt a regression-discontinuity design (RDD), first introduced by Thistlethwaite and Campbell (1960) 17 , to evaluate the real wage effects of the introduction of male conscription. In Section 2, we established that the probability of being treated -i.e. the probability of being posted into the armed services -changed discontinuously around a precise cut-off point. In 1939, males born before 1 st . October -i.e. the first three quarters of that year's cohort-were the last who were obliged to register. However, both our first-and second-stage regressions -incorporating, respectively, proportions posted by year of birth and average real wages by year of birth as dependent variables -are based on annual data. Therefore, we have to impose the break at 1 January 1940 rather than 1 st October, 1939. Below, we outline an alternative estimation procedure that helps us to check on the sensitivity of measuring the break with a three month lag.
Utilising the data presented in Table 1 The facts that, in our setting, the forcing variable (year of birth) is discrete by nature and the regression function is fitted separately on both sides of the discontinuity means that the polynomial approximation can only be of relatively low order to preserve reasonable degrees of freedom. Our conclusions are, however, robust to using a cubic rather than a quadratic function of year-of-birth (see footnotes 22 and 23). errors by clustering at birth cohort level (Lee and Card, 2008) .
19 The precise constructions of our wage variables from the three data sources are summarized in Table 2 . We have verified that replacing the basic hourly wage from the NESPD with weekly earnings (that include the effects of overtime) makes no substantive difference to the results.
As stated earlier, annual data on postings and wages preclude us from incorporating October 1 st , 1939 as the precise break-point for conscription. This forces us to lose some statistical power. By having to focus on the January 1 st , 1940 as the break-point means that the discontinuity amounts to about 20 percentage points while the true pre/post October 1 st is closer to 30%. 20 We adopted an alternative strategy in an attempt to tackle this problem. We excluded individuals born in 1939 from the samples used to estimate (1) and (2). The main advantage of this approach is that it allows us implicitly to extrapolate the 1930-38 polynomial fit to 1939 thereby yielding a jump of about 30%. This is shown in the lower graph of Figure 2 . An offsetting disadvantage is that this strategy is likely to reduce the precision of the estimates. In other words, it involves a trade-off between the increased statistical power of the larger discontinuity in the conscription pattern and the weaker precision of the pre reform polynomial fit.
Data for the first stage regression are obtained from Wallis (1977-see Table 1) while the second stage data relate to the NESPD, GHS and FES sources. Therefore, estimating the impact of military conscription on wages by computing the local average treatment of conscription -i.e. the impact of conscription on those who were 'forced' to take up service because they were born before 1940 -is obtained using Two Sample
Two Stage Least Squares (TS2SLS) (Angrist and Krueger, 1992; Inoue and Solon, 2006 ).
Since we are using one instrument in an exactly identified specification, the TS2SLS 20 estimator is the reduced form effect of conscription divided by the first stage effect. In terms of equations (1) and (2) allowing the slopes to differ on both sides of the 1940 cutoff. We also show the equivalent graphs for females. In the event, both graphs indicate that, at best, the breaks appear to be very small. The first-stage estimates are shown in column (1) of Table 2 . In line with Figure   2 , they show that, at the 1940 breakpoint, there was a conscription discontinuity of 21%. If we drop the 1939 cohort, the comparable estimate is 32%. 22 Columns (2) - (4) 21 Which amounts to us including a quartic term in age rather than age and age-squared.
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Although they are less precisely estimated, the first stage coefficients are of the same order of magnitude when we use a cubic rather than a quadratic function of year-of-
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show the reduced form effects of the ending of conscription on the log of hourly real wage rates. Across all three data sets -by both estimation strategies, and by differing age and wage specifications -there are no significant jumps in male real wages at the conscription discontinuities. 23 Columns (5) - (7) 
Robustness checks
We carry out three robustness checks.
(a) Females
Females were excluded from post-war conscription. If there were no conscription effects for males, we would expect to obtain equivalent results for females if we estimated wage equation (2) 'as if' women were conscripted. Since there are clearly no equivalent first-stage data for females, we can only show the reduced form female equation (2) estimates. Table 3 reports our findings. 24 In general, and in line with birth: the estimate is 0.14 (significant at the 5% level) when individuals born in 1939 are included and 0.35) (significant at the 10% level) when they are excluded.
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The reduced form estimates are also not significantly different from zero when we use a cubic rather than a quadratic function of year-of-birth. 24 The NESPD under-reports individuals who earn less than the Pay As You Earn (PAYE) tax threshold in Britain. This is not a problem with male data but is more serious in the case of females. Accordingly, we re-weight the NESPD female data so as to be in line with GHS where this problem does not occur. Since the FES has slightly higher proportions of females below the threshold, we also re-weighted this series to conform the equivalent male reduced forms in Table 2 , we obtain no significant estimates in respect of the discontinuity. 25 We also note from the graphical illustrations in Figure 3 that the male and female fitted polynomial plots appear to be very similar.
(b) Differing age bands
We checked on the sensitivity of the Table 2 results to the introduction of differing male age ranges on either side of the discontinuity. We show two of these in Table 4 , for ± 7 years, and ± 5 years using the NESPD and the 1940 discontinuity. Our earlier conclusion that there is no significant break remains unchanged. The results reflect all those obtained using the GHS and FES as well as all results omitting individuals born in 1939.
(c) Schooling and training effects
In Section 2 we pointed out that deferred postings among those undertaking post-school education and training rose considerably towards the end of the conscription period. From Table 1 , column (4), we see that this was a growing phenomenon for those born in the years 1935 to 1939. The obvious inference is that,
given it was known as early as 1957 that conscription was likely to end by 1960, there was a take-up of more apprenticeships and higher education places due to attempts to avoid ultimate call-up. One unintended consequence of such action would be to increase the take-up of education and training among men compared to women (Card to the GHS. For more discussion on this issue see Hart (2009a) . In the event, reweighting makes little difference to the results obtained. Specifically, we made use of the 1979-1991 annual LFS and the 1992-1999 quarterly LFS to create a dataset which contains the following harmonized variables: year of birth, age, sex, country of birth, age left full-time education, completion of apprenticeship, and highest qualification held. 27 Female equivalents are not shown: less than 6% of females completed apprenticeships over these birth cohorts.
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1939) and then a drop after the abolition of the military service for individuals born from 1940 onwards. It is therefore in line with the deferments figures discussed in Section 2. Notwithstanding this observation, it is probable that the impact of this source of avoidance/postponement factor on our estimates is negligible. First, the drop in the fraction of males having completed an apprenticeship was spread over several cohorts rather than immediately and in fact the 1939/1940 discontinuity is quite small. Second, the potential problem is significantly reduced in our estimates that exclude the 1939 cohort from the samples (see Table 2 ) since we note that Figure 5 reveals very similar proportions of males having completed an apprenticeship in the 1938 and 1940 cohorts.
Finally, in Figure 6 , we examine the evolution of the proportions of males and females holding a higher education or degree qualification. 28 In contrast to apprenticeships, these graphs show no evidence of a drop in the proportion of males (relative to females) holding a higher education qualification after 1939. The postponing/avoidance story hence seems to have been driven mainly by apprenticeships. This seems consistent with the fact that in the final years of military conscription, more deferments were granted to apprentices than to university students (see footnote 6).
Our second approach to investigating possible impacts of education and training at the conscription discontinuity involved RDD estimation based on the annual LFS data.
28 These cover a higher degree, first degree, diploma in higher education, teaching qualification (further education, secondary, primary, foundation stage), nursing qualification, as well as several other higher education diplomas below degree level.
Using birth cohorts from 1933 to 1947 29 we estimated, for males and females separately, the following equation:
where FTED is average age left full-time education. Also using LFS, we substituted APPRENT, the proportion completing an apprenticeship, and HIGHED, proportion with a higher educational or degree qualification. Using each of the three dependent variables separately for males and females in the age range 25-61, we obtained s ' 1 γ that are insignificantly different from zero using either education variables. Results are reported in Table 5 .
The end of National Service and deferred postings: a cautionary note
As we have seen, by the end of the period all postings consisted of deferments.
Thus, while those born in 1942 were notionally eligible to be conscripted in 1960 (i.e.
the final year of National Service) new call-ups of 18 year olds ended at the end of the third quarter of 1939. In an earlier working paper (Hart, 2009) and in Buonnano (2007) , no adjustment was made for deferments in the RDD. Results obtained are interesting 27 because, while erroneous, they appear to be much more consistent with the prevailing view that spells of military service significantly impair future real earnings for cohorts eligible for conscription compared to subsequent cohorts.
What if we re-set the discontinuity in the CONSCRIPT variable and the year of birth functions in equation (2) to 1943? Figure 7 shows the resulting graphical illustrations. Now the discontinuity in wages around the 1943 cut-off appears to be significantly negative for males eligible for conscription compared to subsequent cohorts. By contrast, there appear to be no significant difference for females. These outcomes are confirmed by the reduced form estimates based on equation (2). 30 This is seemingly in line with negative long term pay effects of conscription on male labour market outcomes compared to their non-applicability for females.
While we know that these estimates are misleading, because no postings were in fact made after 1939, it is nonetheless interesting to investigate what lies behind the findings. The likely answer relates to the need to test for jumps at non-discontinuity points in RDD (see Imbens and Lemieux, 2008, Section 7.3) . Note from the male graph in Figure 7 that an outlying point occurs at the 1945 birth cohort. A possible explanation of this relates to the baby boom which peaked immediately after the war. Figure 8 shows (2) to 1946, which lies near the peak of the boom? We see from Figure 9 that the pre-1946 male cohorts, in sharp contrast to setting the discontinuity at 1943, appear to enjoy a higher wage trajectory than subsequent cohorts, although the reduced form estimates now give somewhat weaker support.
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If we set the discontinuity at 1946, it is hard to judge whether the resulting male polynomials in Figure 9 fit the data better or worse than the comparable plots in Figure   7 . But, unlike 1943, the period around 1946 offers a potentially strong explanation for the RDD outcomes. The labour market was relatively tight throughout the late 1950s and 1960s. Male industrial labour supply rose very significantly in the early 1960s as a result of the baby boom cohorts entering the labour market for the first time. The male discontinuity in Figure 9 may be indicating that this enhanced labour supply served to depress the unit price of labour services. In terms of conscription effects, it also incidentally served to produce spurious 1943 outcomes. 
Conclusions
We argue that it is difficult to make definitive judgements as to net costs and benefits of male military conscription. In the event, and based on a regression 31 Again based on the NESPD, the estimates (standard errors) of β 1 in equation (2) using a 1946 discontinuity are: men, 0.014 (0.005); women, 0.002 (0.009). 32 One possibility is that the effects near to 1945 simply derive from the changing characteristics of the sample. Using our most accurate data source, the NESPD, we checked both wage and employment patterns by birth year from 1935 to 1955 in respect of each year of the NESPD data (i.e. 1975 to 2001) . We found no irregularities around 1945. 
1933-1947
Note: Regressions are based on year of birth averages and are weighted by the number of observations in each cell.
